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Title V of the 2nd Lomi Convention
Between the EEC and ACP States: A
Critical Assessment of the Industrial
Cooperation Regime as it
Relates to Africa
INTRODUCTION

On October 31, 1979, representatives from fifty-eight AfricanCaribbean-Pacific (ACP) 1 and nine European Economic Community
(EEC) States2 signed the second Lom& Convention.' This agreement
will govern the technical, commercial, and financial relations between

the two groups of countries from March 1, 1980 through February 28,
1985. Lom6 II is the fifth 4 in a series of conventions concluded between
I The ACP group initially comprised 46 countries:
(1) The original 18 associates under the Convention of Association between the European
Economic Community and Associated African States, done July 20, 1963, 7 J.0. COMM.
EUR. 1431 (1964), 2 l.L.M. 971 (1963) (enteredintoforce June 1, 1964) [hereinafter cited
as Yaounde I]: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the
Congo, Congolese Republic, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, and Upper Volta;
(2) Mauritius;
(3) 21 Commonwealth States: In Africa: Botswana, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho,
Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia; In the Pacific: Fiji, Tonga, and Western Samoa;
(4) 6 Other African States: Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia,
and Sudan.
See ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6, done Feb. 28, 1975, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L25) 1 (1976),
14 I.L.M. 595, 600 (1975) (enteredintoforce Jan. 30, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Lom6 I]. The ACP
group had grown to 52 when Lom6 II was signed.
2 The nine EEC countries consist of the six original signers of the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of
Rome]: Belgium, France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, plus the three that joined in 1973: Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark. The accession of
Greece in 1981 brought the total EEC membership to 10.
3 ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6 (II), Oct. 31, 1979, reprintedin THE COURIER, Nov. 1979
(special supplement) [hereinafter cited as Lom6 II].
4 The preceding four were: Yaounde I, supra note 1; Convention of Association between the
European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States Associated with that Community, done July 29, 1969, 13 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L282) 1 (1970), 9 I.L.M. 484 (1970) (entered
intoforce Jan. 1, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Yaounde II]; Agreement Establishing an Association
Between the European Economic Community and the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic
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the EEC countries and the developing nations of Africa, the Caribbean,
and the Pacific. Like its predecessors, Lom6 II was designed "to establish a model for relations between developed and developing states," 56
and lay the foundation for a "New International Economic Order."
Toward this end, Lom6 II provided more than 5,607 million European
units of account (EUA) 7---the equivalent of $6,924 million U.S. 8-in
trade and development assistance to the ACP states.9
This comprehensive aid package, together with the elaborate set of
trade and industrial provisions that came with it, has been the subject
of intense scholarly debate in much the same way as were the preceding conventions.' 0 Critical scholarship views Lom6 II as the institutionalization of ACP dependency on Europe and evidence of the EEC's
unwillingness either to treat ACP countries as equals or to concede the
need for a New International Economic Order." On the other hand,
of Uganda and the Republic of Kenya, July 26, 1968, reprintedin 8 I.L.M. 741 (1969); and Lom6 I,
supra note I.
5 Durleux, From Lomh I to Lomb 1H, THE COURIER, Nov. 1979, at 2.
6 See generally F.A.M. ALTING VON GEUSAU, THE LOMil CONVENTION AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1977); C. LUCRON, LA CONVENTION DE LoMti: EXEMPLE DE CO-

OPERATION REUSSIE (1977); M. P. Roy, CONVENTION DE LoMf : AMORCE D'UN NOUVEL ORDRE
ECONOMIQUE INTERNATIONALE (1976). For a definition of the basis, aims, and programs of the
New International Economic Order, see Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 6 Spec. Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975); Development and International Economic Cooperation,
G.A. Res. 3362, 7 Spec. Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/10301 (1976).
7 EUA was a unit made up of a basket of all nine EEC Member Statese currencies and used to
denominate Community aid under the Lom6 Conventions. One EUA was approximately $1.25
U.S. in January 1981. See Rajana, The Lomb Convention: An Evaluation ofEEC EconomicAssistance to the.4.C.P. States, 20 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 179, 181 n.2 (1982).
8 On December 18, 1980, the Council of the European Communities agreed to replace the
EUA with the ECU as the currency unit to express the amounts of financial assistance under
Lom6 II and the previous conventions. The decision took effect on January 1, 1981. Annex XXXII to the Final Act of the Lom6 II treaty provided for the replacement of the unit of account.
See ACP-EEC Council of Ministers, Mar. 1, 1980-Feb. 28, 1981, Lom6 II, supra note 1, at 85.
The ECU is identical to the EUA, and like the EUA is a unit made up of a basket of currencies
comprising specific amounts of the Community Member States' currencies. The value is calculated daily on the basis of representative rates of each Community currency against the dollar as a
common point of reference. Id.
9 See Young-Anawaty, Human Rights and the ACP-EEC Lomh II Convention: Business as
Usualat the EEC, 13 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 63 n.2 (1980).
10 These studies have tended to take the view that any form of economic arrangement between
Africa and Europe is per se suspect and cannot be anything but a cover for continued European
neocolonialist control over the collective African political economy. See, e.g., Martin,Africa and
the Ideology of EurAfrica" Neo-Colonialism or Pan-Africanism?, 20 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 221
(1982); Faculty of Law, University of Ghana, Special Volume: Workshop onACP-EEC Convention
ofLomk, 13 U. GHANA L.J. 1 (1976).
11 See Asante, WillLomb HLeadto More Dependency?, WEST AFRICA, Mar. 30, 1981, at 688;
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literature favorable to the Convention promotes it as a major breakthrough in the otherwise contentious North-South dialogue and an important building block in the emerging EurAfrican community. 12 The
majority of these studies, with but a few qualified exceptions, 3 have
tended to be impressionistic and not rigorously empirical. The approach in this exercise is largely in the tradition of positivist analysis,
that is, a description of ACP-EEC relations as they are, based on empirical evidence, rather than normative analysis which concerns itself
with exposition of these relations as they ought to be.
To avoid either of the above extreme positions, this Comment will
propose an alternative approach for assessing the achievement and
shortcomings of the Lom6 II convention.' 4 Starting from the premise
that Lom6 II, like any other multilateral agreement reached after long
and arduous negotiations, is a compromise that of necessity cannot
fully satisfy either party, this Comment will examine whether a workable document, beneficial to both sides, was the result. What matters is
not how much the Convention falls short of the hoped for vision of a
New International Economic Order between the developed and developing countries; rather, the focus of analysis of its major provisions
should be whether they work in practice, and above all, how well they
do so. Consistent with this formula, this Comment will critically examine Title V, articles 65-82 of Lom6 II which cover the area of industrial cooperation (industrial regime). The assessment will be organized
Garrity, Implications of the Lomb Conventionfor African Trade and Development, 8 REV. BLACK
POL. ECON. 5 (1977); Laishley, EnterLomb I, 104 AFRICA 45 (1980); Madeley, Lomb 2 Falls Way
Short, 100 AFRICA 52, 53 (1979); Muller, EEC Neocolonialism in Action, 24 WORLD MARX REV.
15 (1981); Mytelka & Dolan, The EEC andACP Countries, in INTEGRATION AND UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT 237 (D. Seers & C. Vaitos eds. 1980); Shaw, EEC-ACP Interactions and Images as
Redefinitions of Eur4frica: Exemplary, Exclusive and/or Exploitative?, 18 J. COMM. MKT. STUD.
135 (1979).
12 See ALTING VON GESAU, supra note 6; C. TWITCHETT, EUROPE AND AFRICA: FROM ASSOCIATION TO PARTNERSHIP (1978) [hereinafter cited as TwiTcHET-r 1]; I. ZARTMAN, THE POLITICS
OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1971) [hereinafter cited as ZARTMAN 1]; Curtin, Africa andthe European Community: The Second Lomb Convention, EUROPA 1980-81, at 57; Gruhn, The Lomb Convention: Inching Towards Interdependence, 30
INT'L ORGANIZATION 241 (1976); Twitchett, Lomb II Signed" What it Meansforthe 58 Developing
Countries, 18 ATL. COMMUNITY Q. 85 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Twitchett 2]; Zartman, Europe
and Africa: Decolonization or Dependency?, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 325 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Zartman 2].

13 See, e.g., Yelpaala, The Lomb Conventions and the PoliticalEconomy of the African-Caribbean-Pacfc Countries: A CriticalAnaysis of the Trade Provisions, 13 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
807 (1981). Using available statistical data, Yelpaala provides an empirically rigorous reappraisal
of the trade provisions of Lom6 I and Lom6 II. See also Rajana, supra note 7. For a balanced
and comprehensive assessment of these conventions, see E. FREY-WOUTERS, THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND THE THIRD WORLD (1980).
14 Lom II, supra note 3.
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around four key questions: (1) What did the industrial regime set out
to accomplish? (2) What institutional mechanism was designed for implementing the provisions of Title V? (3) How effective have the provisions been? (4) Who has been the ultimate beneficiary of Title V? In
seeking answers to these questions, this Comment will identify some of
the major weaknesses of Title V and offer a few recommendations in
anticipation of Lom6 III.
The Comment will be organized into four sections. The conventions culminating in Title V will be reviewed in the first section. This
brief historical foray will provide an appreciation of the origins of the
ACP-EEC relationship and is necessary background for understanding
Lom6 II, as well as placing in proper perspective the critical commentaries that hailed the Convention's arrival. The first section of the Comment will attempt to underscore the problem of the imbalance of the
distribution of industrial production capacity between industrialized
Europe and the developing world of the ACP States. 5 It is precisely
because of this problem that an industrial regime was inserted in the
Lomd Conventions. The second section will analyze the negotiations
for Lom6 II, identify the priorities of the various negotiating parties
and the major issues that were raised, and explain how they were eventually resolved. As the analysis moves into the third section, the focus
shifts from recounting the negotiating that went into the making of Title V of the Lom6 II Convention to commenting on its provisions.
Where appropriate, comparisons will be made with the Lomb I counterpart. A detailed assessment of Title V's provisions in light of the
industrial needs and priorities of the African states is reserved for the
fourth section which will also examine the question whether the industrial regime under Lom6 II is an improvement over that of Lom6 I.
Quantitative and qualitative data will be marshalled to aid in the analysis. Finally, the Comment will close with an examination of Title V in
the context of the search for a New International Economic Order. It
will hazard a position as to whether the genre of ACP-EEC partnership
typified in Title V holds out any hope for African industrial development, and if not, why not.
I.

FROM PART IV OF THE TREATY OF ROME TO LOMt II

A. The Beginnings of Association
The 1957 Treaty of Rome established the European Economic
15 See

generally

UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, WORLD IN-

DUSTRY SINCE 1960: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS (1979) [hereinafter cited as UNIDO].
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Community (EEC) with Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands as the founding
Member States.6 At the time of negotiations for the Treaty, Belgium,
France, and to some extent Italy and the Netherlands still had overseas
colonies and were concerned about retaining a special relationship between themselves and their overseas territories.17 In order to accommodate the special needs of these colonial powers and in particular to
satisfy French demands,'" the Community included provisions for association with the non-European colonies in the 1957 Treaty of
2
Rome, 9 covering such areas 20 as trade, aid, and establishment. '
16 Treaty of Rome, supra note 2.
17 See E. DJAMSON, THE DYNAMICS OF EURO-AFRICAN COOPERATION (1976); TWITCHETT 1,
supra note 12.
18 It has been suggested that France set as a precondition for joining the EEC the inclusion of
her vast overseas colonial empire in the new economic arrangement. This position was quite
understandable given the fact that the French economy was inextricably linked to those of the
colonies. Over the decades, a very closed and centralized economic system had evolved between
the mitropole and the overseas territories which could not be abandoned without severe costs to
the French economy as well as France's overall philosophy of a EurAfrican community. At the
more practical and immediate level, the closed trade system was beginning to weaken: (1) the
colonies were producing more raw materials, notably coffee, than the French market could absorb; and (2) the huge transfers of public funds from metropolitan France to the overseas dependencies were beginning to hurt the French exchequer. The problem of the agricultural surplus
would be resolved by extending the French system to the rest of the Community while contributions from the EEC partners toward the infrastructural development of the overseas dependencies
would relieve the French treasury of shouldering this heavy burden alone. See Van Benthem van
den Bergh, The New Convention ofAssociation with African States, I COMMON MKT. L. Rnv. 156,
157-160 [hereinafter cited as van den Bergh]. See also TWITCHETr 1,supra note 12, at 12; Mytelka
and Dolan, supra note 11, at 237. For a discussion of the centrality of the concept of EurAfrican
relations in French official policy, see V. McKAY, AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS 134-49 (1963). See
also COMMISSION JEANNENEY, LA POLITIQUE DE COOPERATION AVE LES PAYS EN VOIE DE

DEVELOPPEMENT (1964); Martin, supra note 10; van den Bergh, supra, at 159 n.5.
19 It should be pointed out that France's five partners acquiesced reluctantly to the inclusion
of Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. The Dutch and West Germans, in particular, were not positively committed to it and found themselves in the somewhat distasteful position of actively subsidizing French colonial adventures in Africa. See TWITCHETT I, supra note 12, at 11 passim.
20 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, pt. IV, arts. 131-36 for the provisions relating to the basic
aspects of this association. In addition, a separate set of provisions, id. art. 238, enabled the Community to conclude agreements with a third country, a union of states, or an international organization thereby creating an "Association" which embodied reciprocal rights and obligations, joint
actions, and appropriate forms of procedure.
21 The specific objectives of Association were set forth in Article 132.
Association shall have the following objectives:
1) Member States shall apply to their trade with the countries and territories the same treatment as they accord each other pursuant to this Treaty.
2) Each country or territory shall apply to its trade with Member States and with the other
countries and territories the same treatment as that which it applies to the European State
with which it has special relations.
3) The Member States shall contribute to the investments required for the progressive development of these countries and territories.
4) For capital investments financed by the Community, participation in tenders and sup-
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The Treaty provided inter alia for the establishment of a free trade

zone that was to apply to trade among EEC members as well as trade
between the EEC and Africa, and finally to trade among the colonial
African Associates."2 The Treaty also provided for the progressive

elimination of trade restrictions pursuant to a complicated schedule
which, over a twelve to fifteen year period, would result in the elimination of quotas on trade between any Member States.23 The Treaty
sought to multilateralize the burdens of aid for the Community by set-

ting up a European Overseas Development Fund with approximately
$581 million to be allocated among the individual Associates by the
EEC Commission on the basis of project requests.2 4 With respect to
the rights of establishment which spelled out rules covering expatriate
personnel, the Treaty provided for equal conditions for nationals of all
EEC Members.25
The Treaty of Rome was barely three years old when a majority of
Associates acceded to political independence. It was therefore necessary to revise the original Association agreement and to conclude a new

one which would reflect the dramatically changed political status of the
African Associates. 6 It is generally conceded that the Association regime established by the Treaty of Rome was an association "imposed
from above,"'2 7 that is, the arrangement was imposed on the Associated
plies shall be open on equal terms to all natural and legal persons who are nationals of a
Member State or one of the countries and territories.
5) In relations between Member States and the countries and territories the right of establishment of nationals and companies or firms shall be regulated in accordance with the
provisions and procedures laid down in the chapter relating to right of establishment and
on a non-discriminatory basis, subject to any special provisions laid down pursuant to
Article 136.
Id. art. 132. These objectives were elaborated upon in Articles 133, 134 and 135 of the Treaty and
its Implementing Convention.
22 Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 132, paras. 1-2.
23 Id. arts. 133-34; Implementing Convention, art. I, annex Z, art. 3, annex B.
24 ZARTMAN 1,supra note 12, at 16.
25 The principle of nondiscrimination contained in Article 132, Paragraph 5, of the Treaty of
Rome was directed at the monopoly enjoyed by French companies and enterprises in overseas
France. The message in Article 132 was unmistakably clear: henceforth these colonies would no
longer remain the chasse gardhe of French entrepreneurs. TwITCHETr 1, supra note 12, at 26.
26 See Zartman 2, supra note 12 (a detailed discussion of the negotiations leading to the Yaounde association). See also TWITCHETT 1, supra note 12 (an analysis of Yaounde I and II).
27 TWrrCHETr 1,supra note 12, at 2. See also DmAMsON, supra note 17, at 4 (offering a legal
explanation for this apparent asymmetry in the Treaty of Rome Association by correctly pointing
out that since the overseas territories had no international personality at the time of the agreement
they could not possibly be signatories). Djamson's explanation is much too formalistic, for it
seems to suggest that had both parties to the Treaty been sovereign states a more egalitarian
arrangement would have resulted. The flaw in this line of reasoning has been amply exposed in
the many critical commentaries that have been directed at subsequent conventions since the
Treaty of Rome. While these agreements were concluded between independent African states and
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countries and territories by their respective mtropoles while the indige-

nous authorities played little or no part in its elaboration.2" Its succes-

sor regime, Yaounde I and Yaounde II,29 was viewed as a major
improvement since it succeeded in converting the unilateral provisions
of the Rome Treaty into what Professor Zartman calls, "a negotiated
Association between the European Community and 18 individual African States." 3 The new regime, therefore, was hailed as a multilateral
treaty between two groups of independent sovereign states which "laid
the foundations for a different aid relationship to that existing under
Rome Treaty association."'"
In practice, the Yaounde Conventions3 2 continued many of the
policies of the Treaty of Rome while at the same time introducing some
innovations in the Association arrangement.33 The Yaounde association, in particular that under Yaounde II, addressed for the first time
an area neglected in previous conventions, the promotion of industrialization in the Associated countries. 34
the European Community, the thrust of these criticisms is that the structure of dependency which
characterized EurAfrican relations during the Rome Treaty era has persisted into the postcolonial
phase of this relationship. Notwithstanding the formality of granting political independence to,
and the exercise of the attributes of sovereignty by, these erstwhile colonial territories, the fundamental structure of their relationship with Europe has not changed. It still remains an exploitative
and unequal relationship. See general, S. AMIN, NEO-COLONIALISM IN WEST AFRICA (1973); A.
EMMANUEL, UNEQUAL EXCHANGE: A STUDY OF THE IMPERIALISM OF TRADE (1972); K.
NKRUMAH, NEo-COLONIALIsM: THE LAST STAGE OF IMPERIALISM (1965); W. RODNEY, How

EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA (1972); Dolan, The Lom6 Convention and Europe'sRelationship with the Third World- A CriticalAna3ysis, 1 REVUE D'INTEGRATION EUROPEENE 369 (1977).
28 TWITCHETT 1, supra note 12, at 33.

29 There is little basic difference between Yaounde I and II, the latter, in many respects, being
a mere continuation of Yaounde I. See TWITCHETT 1, supra note 12, at 73; ZARTMAN 1, supra

note 12, at 330.
30 See ZARTMAN 1, supra note 12, at 329.
31 See Twitchett 2, supra note 12, at 94, 98.
32 The first Yaounde Convention was signed on July 20, 1963 and came into effect on June 1,
1964. Yaounde I, supra note 1. It was scheduled to govern relations between the six original EEC
members and the eighteen independent African States for five years. It was allowed to continue in
operation until 1971 when the 1969 Yaounde Convention came into force. Yaounde I1,supra note
4. See TWITCHETT 1, supra note 12, at 73.
33 For instance, under the Yaounde Convention, the Associates were free to organize their
commercial relations both with each other and third countries. This was not possible under the
Treaty of Rome. Also, in the area of financial and technical cooperation, the Yaounde association
provided a more flexible approach to developmental aid and a wider range of financial techniques
than was available under the Treaty of Rome. See TWITCHETT 1, supra note 12, at 99.
34 Id. at 119. Despite the fact that previous conventions subscribed to the view of diversification of the economies of the Associates, the financial aid that was disbursed by the European
Development Fund (EDF) was used mainly for infrastructural investments while "plans of a directly productive and industrial character were discouraged." FREY-WOUTERS, supra note 13, at
15.

Title V of the 2nd Lomb Convention

5:352(1983)
B.

The State of Industrial Development in Africa

The problem of the imbalance in the distribution of industrial output and production capacity between the Less Developed Countries
(LDCs) and the developed countries of the North Atlantic Community
has been a sore point in the numerous North-South dialogues both
before and after the Yaounde conventions." On the eve of the Yaounde regime's debut, Africa stood out as the least industrialized continent in the world.3 6 In 1971, the continent was responsible for only
8.2% of the total industrial production of the LDCs and only 0.6% of
world industrial production.3 7 African industry is dominated by light
industries such as the manufacture of food, beverages, and tobacco
(43%) and the textile, wearing apparel, and leather industries (19%).
Heavy industries, on the other hand, account for less than 25% of industrial production.3" By way of contrast, 42.1% of total industrial production for Asia for the period 1970-75 was devoted to heavy industry,
market econo52.3% for Latin American and 64% for the developed
39
mies of Western Europe and North America.
Within the African continent itself there were and still are severe
geographical imbalances in the distribution of industrial production.
African industry is highly concentrated with only ten countries accounting for nearly eighty percent of industrial production.' But even
more importantly, the bulk of African industrial production-fifty-six
percent of the total-is concentrated in North Africa, a region not included in the various association agreements discussed here.41 Thus,
the lack of an adequate industrial base was, and continues to be, particularly problematic for sub-Saharan African countries who, without exception, were (or have since become) signatories of the Yaounde
agreement and subsequent conventions.
The Yaounde association, in marked contrast to the Rome Treaty,
sought to alleviate the imbalance between European and African industrial development. Under Yaounde II, investment financing in a
variety of forms was made available to meet the challenge of rapid
35 See UNIDO, supra note 15.
36 Huybrechts, Industry in Africa, EUROPA 1980-81, at 49.
37 Id.

38 Id. at 49-51. The leading heavy industries are the manufacture of chemicals and petroleum,

coal, rubber products, and metal products.
39 UNIDO, supra note 15, at 66.
40 Huybrechts, supra note 36, at 52.
41 EEC relations with the Maghreb are governed by a separate set of accords. See, e.g., Robert, The EEC andthe MaghrebandMashreq Countries, in INTEORATION AND UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT 261 (D. Seers & C. Vaitos eds. 1980).
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industrialization of the countries associated with the EEC.4 2 The efforts were modest but were symbolic of the Community's recognition
of the problem. EEC funds earmarked for industrial development
jumped from less than 1.0% of total Community aid for the entire duration of the Rome Treaty to a respectable, albeit unspectacular, 7.15%
during the life of Yaounde II.43 This emphasis on industrial promotion
was renewed and elaborated upon in the subsequent conventions that
would replace the Yaounde association.
C. Industrial Cooperation Under Lom6 I
The industrial regime under Lom6 I" has been acknowledged by
all the signatory states to the Convention to be one of its outstanding
features.45 The European Commission, which is the administrative
arm of the EEC and clearly not an unbiased judge, believes that it is
unlikely that any other EurAfrican agreement has defined with such
completeness and detail the ways in which the industrialized and developing countries can cooperate in the field of industrial development.4 6
Toward the attainment of this mutually desirable end, Lom6 I devoted
an entire chapter to setting forth the objectives of an ACP-EEC indus47
trial development policy.
In an innovative departure from previous conventions, Lom6 I
spelled out the instruments to be used in implementing the industrial

cooperation policy. A Committee on Industrial Cooperation4" (CIC)

was created and charged with the tasks of overseeing the implementation of Title III, noting any problems that might arise, suggesting solu42 Investment finance came in four forms: (1) ordinary loans from the European Investment
Bank (EIB) at prevailing interest rates; (2) EIB loans with various interest rebates guaranteed by
EDF grants; (3) special long-term, low interest loans from the EDF; and (4) risk capital for longterm projects. See TWITCHETr 1, supra note 12, at 119.
43 Id. at 136. Under Yaounde I the proportion of development aid set aside for industrial
development was 5.61% of the total aid package. Id.
44 See Lom6 I, supra note 1.
45 K. FOCKE, FROM LOM. 1 TowARDs LOMt 2 30 (1980) (Office for Official Publications of
the European Communities).
46 Industrial Cooperation, THE COU.IER, Mar. 1975, at 31 [hereinafter cited as Industrial
Cooperation].
47 Lom6 I, supra note 1, tit. III, arts. 26-39. These objectives were: the development of infrastructures connected with industrialization (transport, energy, research, etc.); contributions to the
setting up of manufacturing industries and especially the processing of local raw materials; industrial training schemes in Europe and the ACP States; measures for providing access to technology
and its adaptation of local needs; a special effort on behalf of small and medium-sized firms;
industrial information, promotion, and study schemes; and accompanying trade promotion
measures.
48 Id. art. 35.
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tions, and reporting to the'Committee of Ambassadors.4 9 The CIC was
also responsible for guiding and supervising the Center for Industrial

Development (CID)-an industrial information-gathering, contactmaking, and liaison organization jointly managed by the ACP-EEC
countries.5 0 This "unique experiment"' in industrial cooperation was
designed to serve as a catalyst for inducing the EEC private sector to
invest in the ACP States. 2 The financing of the industrial cooperation
regime was left in the hands of the European Development Fund
(EDF) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). During the period
that Lom&I was in force, a total of 484 million EUA were allocated by

the EDF and the EIB for co-financing roughly forty projects in the
ACP States. 3 This amount represented about sixteen percent of a total
multilateral investment of three billion EUA in the ACP States which
included the following: 458 million EUA provided by the EEC, 582
million EUA provided by the Arab Funds, and 364 million EUA provided by the World Bank.5 4

Although the Lom6 I objectives in regard to industrial cooperation
were acclaimed to be innovative, 5 ambitious, 56 and generous, 57 it soon
became evident that the regime was unable to deliver the promises
made by its sponsors. The failure of the industrial regime under Lom6

I has been attributed to several factors. A problem of prime impor49 The Committee of Ambassadors is one of the institutional innovations under Lom6 I. It is
composed of one representative from each Member State, one representative of the EEC, and one
representative from each ACP State. The office of chairman is held alternately by the EEC and
the ACP States. The Committee assists the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers (Council) and carries
out any mandate entrusted to it by the latter, reviews the functioning of the Convention and the
achievement of its objectives, accounts to the Council for its action and may submit to it resolutions, recommendations, or opinions, and supervises the work of the standing or ad hoc committees, bodies, or working groups. See Lom6 I, supra note 1, arts. 76-79.
50 The CID was formally established in January 1977, the third year of application of Lom6 I.
In each of the states which are parties to the Convention, the Center enjoys the most extensive
legal capacity accorded to legal persons and is made responsible for carrying out the tasks laid
down in Article 36 of the Lom6 I Convention. The CID is administered by a director and a
deputy director, both appointed by the CIC, and advised by an Advisory Council composed of 14
members with industrial experience chosen on an individual basis from nationals of states party to
the Convention on the grounds of their qualifications and experience. See Report of the ACPEEC Council of Ministers, Apr. 1, 1976-Feb. 29, 1980, ACP-EEC Cooperation, Analysis-Application, at 100-01 [hereinafter cited as Annual Report 1].
51 IndustrialCooperation,supra note 46, at 31.
52 Id.
53 FocKF, supra note 45, at 34.
54 Id.
55 See FREY-WoUTrERs, supra note 13, at 58.
56 FocKE, supra note 45, at 30.
57 ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly Working Documents, Report on behalf of the Joint
Committee, Sept. 27, 1978, at 23 [hereinafter cited as Guillabert Report].
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tance was the insufficient emphasis placed at the outset upon defining a
"precise and meaningful policy on industrial cooperation.""8 As the
Focke Report noted, this defect was one common to "practically all
policies on aid for the industrial development of the developing countries." 59 Instead of formulating a coherent policy geared to the industrial development needs of the ACP States, much effort was wasted on
the generation of studies on industrialization policy which for the most
part were never acted upon.60
The problem of inadequate financial resources for carrying out the
ambitious industrial program also contributed to the failure of the first
industrial regime.6 ' In a recent study by Professor Frey-Wouters, she
notes that:
It would be a mistake to think that industrial cooperation on a worthwhile
scale can be undertaken without finance, simply by contact and coordination, a modicum of information, or, in the last resort, visits by industrial
or expert missions. The success of industrial cooperation depends on the
money available.
In its broadest sense, the finance it requires is
62
considerable.

Symptomatic of financing problems were the budgetary limitations that
the CID had to endure. Although the Center was charged with implementing the objectives of Article 36, its budget for the last three years
that Lom6 I was in force amounted to 6,389,446 EUA which was less
than one percent of the sectoral allocation to industrial cooperation. Of
this amount, roughly one-half (3,627,979 EUA) went to the'Center's
operating costs and the remainder (2,761,467 EUA) to program expenditures. 63 Reluctance on the part of the EEC private sector to invest
in ACP countries was another factor which lessened the effectiveness of
the Lom6 I industrialization scheme.' Even though provisions were
included in the Convention for establishing a suitable working environment for EEC commercial operators, fears continued to be voiced
58 Annual Report 1, supra note 50, at 113.
59 FocKE, supra note 45, at 30-3 1; see FREY-WOUTERS, supra note 13, at 65. See also supra
text accompanying note 46.
60 FocKE, supra note 45, at 31. Frey-Wouters points out that industrial policies promoted by
the EEC have tended to favor Eurocentric models of development. FREY-WOUTERS, supra note
13, at 63.
61 FocKE, supra note 45, at 31; FREY-WOUTERS, supra note 13, at 61. The problem of limited
EDF aid was further compounded by the limited access to EIB resources by the ACP States. The
fact that the bulk of EIB loans went to two countries-Nigeria and the Ivory Coast-only worsened the existing unevenness in the allocation of EEC aid among countries as well as among the
various sectors. See Annual Report 1, supra note 50, at 113.
62 FREY-Wou-rERS, supra note 13, at 61.
63 Annual Report 1, supra note 50, at 100.
64 FREY-WoUTERS, supra note 13, at 64.
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about the security of their investments in the ACP States given their
history of instability. 5
In addition to the aforementioned difficulties, industrial cooperation under Lom6 I was also plagued with serious structural problems.
The most persistent and dislocating of these problems was the lack of
coordination among the different organizations-the CIC, CID, EDF
and EIB-charged with implementing the objectives of Title III.66
Since none of these institutions had an overall view of the industrial
development program, they were working at cross-purposes.
Finally, the overall thrust of the Lom6 I industrial regime, that is,
the promotion of ACP industrialization, was also found wanting. The
regime, many believed, was notably successful not in achieving its
avowed objectives, but in reinforcing the orthodox division of labor
which is at the base of EurAfrican relations.67 This Eurocentric version
of comparative advantage has for centuries locked Africa into the role
of a primary producing hinterland while freeing Europe to engage in
the most capital-intensive, technologically-advanced types of production. Lom6 I continued this scheme although it did allow the ACP
States to engage in some limited labor-intensive manufacturing activities such as first stage import-substitution and relatively light industries. 6 But even here, the Lom6 I record is hardly a glowing one
according to its critics. Such critics point to export figures in traditional
import-substitution industries such as textiles where Africa's share of
world manufacturing value-added decreased during the lifetime of
Lom6 1.69 While world manufacturing exports peaked during this period, the African share declined both in relative and absolute terms.7 0
In terms of ACP-EEC trade, manufactured exports declined as a per65 See Guillabert Report, supra note 57, at 23. The European Commission did acknowledge
the failure of Lom6 I to interest the European business community in promoting industrial development in the ACP States. See European Community Commission, Information DirectorateGeneral, Doc. 299/X75-F(E), 9/75, at 16-17. See also FREY-WOUTERS, supra note 13, at 64-65.
66 FocKE, supra note 45, at 31.
67 Martin, supra note 10, at 230. But see C. VAN DER VAEREN, EVALUATION GLOBALE DES
AIDES COMMUNATTAIRE 6 (1979). In this study on the impact of Community aid on the ACP
States, the author concludes that without Lom6 I aid, the combined incremental growth of agricultural and industrial output in the ACP would have been 0.4-0.5% less than it was between 1975-79.
The study also credits the EEC intervention in the ACP with generating about 1.0-1. 11% of the
growth output for the same period. See also Rajana, supra note 7, at 213-14.
68 See Martin, supra note 10.
69 UNIDO, supra note 15, at 37.
70 See L. Mytelka, Africa: A Primary Producing Hinterland for Europe 4 (Apr. 1981) (unpublished paper prepared for the Department of State as part of its external research program).
Mytelka points out that textile exports from Africa, for example, fell by $127 million (current U.S.
dollars) from 1970-71 to 1973-76. Id.
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centage of total ACP exports to the EEC from a high of roughly twenty
percent in 1974 to a low of ten percent in 1978.71 Significantly, this
drop was accompanied by a corresponding decline in the ACP share of
EEC imports of manufactured goods from the Third World.7 2 It was
against this backdrop of ACP dissatisfaction with many features of the
Lom6 I industrial regime that discussions for its replacement
commenced.
II.

NEGOTIATING FOR THE LOMt II INDUSTRIAL REGIME

A.

The Parties Declare Their Stance

Both parties to the Lom6 Convention entered the negotiations with
certain assumptions about their relative bargaining strengths. Speaking for the ACP States, Donald Rainford, the Chairman of the ACP
Committee of Ambassadors, declared that "Europe needs the ACP
countries as much as the latter needs the former. .

.,

[and the] ACP

countries provide a ready source of raw materials for the Community."7 3 Claude Cheysson, development commissioner for the Community, countered with the following:
I also hope ...that [the ACP States] will understand that one essential
characteristic of the Convention is the contract and that there are two
partners to any contract. In other words, they are right to demand that we
understand and be considerate towards their problems, but they too have
to realize that we have our problems and they cannot forever go on making unilateral demands and refusing to let us point out that in some cases
they are goiN too far and that we ourselves have problems that they must
reckon with. 4a
Leaving aside assumptions as to the parties' relative indispensability to each other, their negotiators also had quite definite ideas
on what they wanted included in the new convention. The Ghanaian
legal scholar, S. K. B. Asante, who represented his country during the
initial phases of the negotiations, argues that the ACP States:
approached the negotiations with a view to bringing about a significant
shift in the distribution of benefits in favour of the ACP members...
[while] the EEC representatives approached ... [the negotiations] with
the limited objectives of 'consolidating' Lom6 I and, if possible, improving EEC access to raw materials and obtaining guarantees on its overseas
investments.7 5

There were three major areas around which much of the discussion on
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 News Round-up, THE COURIER, Mar.-Apr. 1979, at VI.
74 Interview with Claude Cheysson, THE COURIER, Mar.-Apr. 1977, at 3, 5.
75 Asante, supra note 11, at 690.
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the industrial regime evolved: funding for industrial cooperation, implementing machinery, and trade on manufactured goods.7 6
B.

Positions on Specific Issues
L

Funding

The ACP States requested a minimum budget of at least $10 billion to finance the entire Lomb II package, complaining that funding
under Lom6 I was inadequate. 7 They recommended that calculations
for EDF V should take account of:
a) finances required for the accelerated development of the ACP States;
b) growth in the gross domestic product of the Member States of the
Community;
c) monetary erosion and world inflation; and
d) an undertaking by the industrialized countries to commit 0.7% of
their GNP to official development aid.78

ACP States asked for a Special Industrial Development Fund to cover
deficiencies in the existing ACP-EEC funding arrangements and to
meet the range of needs observed in the industrial development of their
nations. The special fund was also needed because existing financial
institutions were not flexible enough to respond to the peculiarities of
ACP industrial development. In addition, the ACP requested that an
adequate and separate budget be set aside for the Center for Industrial
Development.7 9
In response, the EEC felt that the emphasis should be on defining
the objectives for industrial cooperation and the possible difficulties
that this exercise might encounter. It was not convinced that special
financial provisions should be made for this purpose or any new organs
established to address this issue.8" The Community then offered the
ACP a financial package of about $6 billion, which was rejected, in a
EEC offer to provide an additional $910 million from EIB resources. 8 '
Although EDF V funds represented an appreciable increase over EDF
IV, there is no indication that funding is tied to EEC gross domestic
product growth rates or world inflation as the ACP had requested.
76

Id.

77 See News Round-up, THE COURIER, Mar.-Apr. 1979, at III. For example, the size of EDF
IV represented an EEC contribution of approximately $2 per year per capita for the population of
the ACP States.
78 Id.
79 Pagni, Negotiationsbegin on new EEC-ACP Convention, THE COURIER, Nov.-Dec. 1978, at
2,3.
80 Outcome of the ACP-EEC Ministerial Conference on 21 December 1978, THE COURIER,
Mar.-Apr. 1979, at 3, 5.
81 The New Lomh Convention, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 1979, at 117.
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Implementing Machinery

The ACP insisted on greater participation in the management and
administration of the EDF.8 2 It also called for a revision in the method
by which aid was channelled by the EDF to the recipient states.13 To
reduce the bureaucratic delays endemic to Lom6 I, the ACP States requested aid to support their respective overall development programs
rather than for specific projects.84 Total aid would simply be divided
up among the fifty-eight ACP States and transferred immediately to
their central banks.8 " Such an approach would obviate the Lomb I
method of giving aid piecemeal which inevitably led to unnecessary
bureaucratic logjams.
The Commission, however, found no problem with the operations
of the EDF; according to one official, it worked "pretty well." 86 As far
as the Commission was concerned, the principal obstacle to aid implementation was the inefficiency of the ACP States. Project description
files were often submitted to the EDF without all the relevant appraisal
information and without adequate documentation." The ACP States,
therefore, needed to be more conscientious in the preparation of project
dossiers drawing freely from the expertise provided by the EDF. The
key to improving the EDF was in organizing its programs, paying particular emphasis to small and medium-sized businesses, micro-projects,
and triangular co-financing (with Arab resources). The Commission
also felt that regional cooperation should be encouraged and nurtured
in such areas as infrastructural development, training, and industry.
To meet this additional burden, the Commission recommended that
the EDF V allocation for regional cooperation be increased from ten to
fifteen percent.88 To improve the roles of the Committee on Industrial
Cooperation and the Center for Industrial Development, the Commission suggested setting up consultation mechanisms to better inform
82 News Round-up, supra note 77.

83 Madeley, supra note 11, at 53; see also Rajana, supra note 7, at 198-99.
84 Madeley, supra note 11, at 53. These delays were brought about by several factors, chief of
which were: (1) the project evaluation division of the EDF Development Directorate was not only
understaffed but its cadre of specialists was generally conceded by several observers to be secondrate; (2) rival interests within the EDF tended to obstruct the expeditious processing of projects;
and (3) the EDF Committee lacked uniform criteria for project evaluation. Rajana, supra note 7,
at 198; see Hewitt & Stevens, The Second Lomg Convention, in EEC AND THE THIRD WORLD 30-

59 (C. Stevens ed. 1981).
85 See Hewitt & Stevens, supra note 84; Madeley, supra note 11, at 53.
86 Lom&II.

Cheysson Outlines Commission'sInitialProposals,THE COURIER, Mar.-Apr. 1978,

at VII. The official was Mr. Claude Cheysson, EEC Commissioner.
87 See Rajana, supra note 7, at 197.

88 Id. at 208-09.
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both the EEC and the ACP about market trends and capacities for production, consumption, and exports in those sectors which particularly
interested either organization.89
As a consequence of the views put forth by both sides, Lom6 II
included a new article which spelled out with greater precision EEC
and ACP responsibilities in the implementation of financial and technical aid. Despite the announced concept of equality and co-management, final decisions on financing still rest with the Commission.
Within the ACP, the role of the Commission Delegate assigned to individual ACP States is still crucial in managing aid relationships.9 0 And
because the EEC is so concerned about closely monitoring how its
funds are spent, aid under Lom6 II is still geared toward specific
projects rather than national development programs.
In response to the expressed concern about delays in processing
and implementing aid, Lom6 II sets up an ACP-EEC Committee
within the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers "to study, in general terms
and on the basis of specific examples, suitable measures to improve the
implementation of financial and technical cooperation."'" The single
most concrete measure for expediting aid delivery is Article 122(5)
which provides that for all contracts under 3.5 million European units
of account, decisions taken by the National Authorizing Officer shall be
deemed approved by the Commission or its delegate unless disapproved within thirty days after notification to the Commission
Delegate.
3. Access to EECMarkets
The decline in the share of ACP exports of processed goods to
EEC markets was traced to the Lom6 I "rules of origin."9 " "Products
originating in the ACP states shall be imported in the community free
of customs duties and charges having equivalent effects."' 93 Originating
products were defined as those wholly obtained in one or more ACP
countries. The product did not qualify for trade preferences, however,
if the value of materials obtained outside the ACP exceeded forty or
fifty percent of the value of the finished product. 94
In practice, non-ACP originating products, even for the more ad89 Pagni, supra note 79, at 2.
90 See Lom6 II, supra note 3, art. 123.
91 Id. art. 108(6).
92 Lom6 I, supra note 1, art. 2.

93 Id. art. 2(1).
94 McQueen, Trade Co-operationin the Lomb Convention: The Need/or Reorm,in THE RENEGOTIATIONS OF THE LOMA CONVENTION 45 (Catholic Institute ed. 1978).
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vanced countries such as Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria, accounted for
from forty-eight to eighty-five percent of the value of the respective
ACP country's products. 95 As a consequence, few African countries
were able to take advantage of the ostensibly generous trade preferences. For most countries, less than fifty percent of their goods qualified for entry into the EEC under Lom. 1.96 Consequently, it was quite
natural that the ACP desired a revision and simplification of the rules
of origin during negotiations for Lom6 II. The ACP States called for
provisions which would allow all ACP originating products, regardless
of the percentage of outside materials, to be imported into the Community free of quantitative restrictions, customs duties, and charges having equivalent effect, subject only to the condition that such treatment
is not more favorable than that granted by the Member States among
themselves.9 7
The EEC responded that the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers9 8 can
waive the rules if there is evidence to suggest that they inhibit development or hinder existing industries or the creation of new ones.9 9 It was

pointed out that all five applications requesting derogations from the
rules were granted. The "rules of origin" were also defended on the
grounds that they discouraged the proliferation of "foot-loose offshore
assembly industries. . . which do not contribute to the development"
of the ACP States. l°° In the final analysis, the Community view prevailed and Lom6 II "rules of origin" are merely minor modifications of
those in Lom. I. In October 1979 when Lomb II was concluded, it
brought to a close sixteen months of negotiations between the ACP and
the EEC. The new industrial regime contained seventeen articles.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE V

A.

Industrial Cooperation Clauses

The provisions on industrial cooperation agreed upon in Lom&II
are contained in Title V, Articles 65 to 82. Article 65 spells out the
general objectives of the regime, while Article 66 narrows these down
into specific areas which for analytical purposes can be grouped into
95 Id.
96 Madeley, supra note 11, at 55.
97 Pagni, supra note 79, at 11.
98 For a description of the composition and functions of the Council, see Lom6 I, supra note 1,
arts. 70-75; Lom6 II, supra note 3, arts. 163-69.
99 The New Lormb Convention, supra note 81, at 116; see also McQueen, supra note 94, at 46.
100 McQueen, supra note 94, at 45.
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eight categories."0 ' Each of these areas of industrial cooperation will
be discussed in some detail in the order in which they are mentioned in
Article 67.
1. IndustrialTraining (Article 68)
The Community undertakes to provide necessary assistance in the
field of industrial training toward the goal of enabling ACP States to
acquire technological skills appropriate to their industrial growth. Toward this end, the Community, on the basis of requests from the ACP
States, will provide assistance in the evaluation of needs and the execution of appropriate schemes such as:
(i) the enrolling of ACP nationals in technical and other training
institutions;
(ii) the establishment of national and regional training and research institutions to provide specialized industrial training for ACP nationals at all levels, as well as to organize practical and in-service
training;
(iii)
the establishment, promotion, and consolidation of appropriate indigenous technologies; and
(iv) the promotion of exchanges between universities and
10 2specialized institutes in the Community and in the ACP States.
2. Development of Small andMedium-Sized Enterprises
(SMEs) (Article 69)
The Community will contribute toward the establishment and development of small and medium-sized industries identified by the ACP
States as important in terms of their development objectives through:
(i) financial and technical cooperation schemes geared to the specific
needs of such industries;
(ii) encouragement by appropriate incentives of the transfer of resources from the Community's private sector (one mode of channeling such transfers of private capital would be in the form of jointventures between Community and ACP SMEs); and
(iii) technical assistance schemes aimed at: (a) evaluating the development potential of SMEs, and (b) identifying possibilities for subcontracting and facilitating the implementation of these programs. 103
3. ProcessingofACP Raw Materials (Articles 70 and 73)
Article 70 acknowledges that "[i]n the framework of overall coop101 The general objective of Lom6 II remains the same as that of Lom6 I, namely to promote
industrial development in the ACP States. Lom6 II, supra note 3, arts. 65-66.
102 Id. art. 68.
103 Id. art. 69(l).
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eration with respect to industrial development, special emphasis [ought
to] be placed on the domestic processing of ACP raw materials with a
view to achieving a larger and more equitable share of processed raw
materials in both production and exports of the ACP States. '' "M To
bring this about, the Community will help:
(i) promote,
develop, and finance processing industries in the ACP
05
States; 1
(ii) conduct feasibility studies;
(iii) evaluate processing possibilities and provide information on
processing technologies; and
(iv) promote within the Community and other markets the exports of
ACP manufactured products.'0
Furthermore, the Community will contribute toward the financing of
ACP industries linked to the development of agriculture and the promotion of agricultural production, 107 and any other line of production
which may increase "value-added locally,"'' 0 have a favorable effect
on employment or the trade balance, facilitate the diversification or regional balance of industrial activities, or foster industrial or interregional cooperation between ACP and EEC firms."°
4. Transfer of Technology (Article 71)
With a view to assisting the ACP States in strengthening their indigenous capacity for scientific and technological development and facilitating the acquisition, transfer, and adaptation of technology under
the best possible terms and conditions, Article 71 commits the Community to contribute to:
(i)
(ii)

the establishment and strengthening of industry-related scientific
and technical infrastructure in the ACP States;
the designing and implementation of research and development

programs;
(iii) promotion of collaboration among research institutes and undertak(iv)

ings of the ACP States, the Community, the individual Member
States, and other countries;
the identification, evaluation, and acquisition on favorable terms of
foreign technology, patents, and other industrial property through
financing and/or other suitable arrangements with firms and insti-

tutions within the Community;
(v)

the provision of advisory services to ACP States for the preparation

104 Id. art. 70.
105 Id. art. 70(1).
106 Id. arts. 70(2)-(4).
107 Id. art. 73(1)(c).
108 Id. art. 73(1)(d).
109 Id.
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of regulations governing the transfer of technology and for the supply of information with respect to:
a) the terms and conditions of technology contracts;
b) the types and sources of technology; and
c) the experience of ACP States and other countries with the use
of certain technology; and
(vi) the promotion of technology cooperation among ACP States and
between them and other developing countries in order to make
1 the
best use of their current scientific and technical inventories. o
5. IndustrialInfrastructure (Article 72)
Article 72 is one of the shortest clauses in the industrial regime
because much of its contents appears in other sections of the regime.
The Article provides that all the means available under the financial
and technical cooperation titles will be mobilized in setting up the infrastructure in the ACP necessary for industrial development in such
fields as transportation and communication, energy, research and adaptation of technology, industrial training, and the location of
industries.'
6. Trade Promotion (Article 74)
Because the Convention devotes a whole chapter to trade cooperation (Title III), discussion of this subject in the industrial regime is very
brief. Assurances are given in Article 74 that ACP States will be able
to profit from the trade arrangements spelled out in Title III. Toward
this end, trade promotion schemes will be carried out to encourage the
marketing of the industrial products of 2ACP States both in the Community and in other external markets."
7

Cooperationin the Field of Energy (Article 76)

The provision on cooperation in the field of energy has as its goal
the development of conventional and non-conventional energy resources which will in the long run help the ACP States achieve selfsufficiency. The following tasks are identified:
(i) the preparation of inventories on energy resources and demand
(commercial as well as noncommercial);
(ii) the development of alternative energy strategies from such sources
as wind, solar, geothermal, and hydro-energy sources;
(iii) the exploration and development of national and regional energy
110 Id. art. 71.
I11 Id. art. 72.
112 Id. art. 74.
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sources in tandem with the establishment of energy-intensive
industry;
(iv) strengthening the management and control of the ACP States over
their energy resources along lines consistent with their development objectives;
(v) the establishment of a rural energy program;
(vi) the promotion of research adaptation and dissemination of appropriate technology as well as training needed to meet manpower
needs;
(vii) the production of equipment for the production of energy as well
as the application of energy-saving techniques;
(viii) monitoring the side effects of energy production on the environment; and
of existing and future energy resources of the
(ix) the conservation
1 13
ACP States.
8.

IndustrialInformation and PromotionActivities (Article 77)

Article 77 undertakes to "ensure and intensify regular information
exchanges and the organization of the necessary contacts in the industrial field between the Community and the ACP States."' 14 The following goals are mentioned:
(i) to gather and disseminate all relevant information concerning
trends in industrial policies in the Community, the ACP States, and
the world-at-large;
(ii) to organize meetings to review these matters;
(iii) to provide appropriate channels for linking up industrial policymakers, promoters, and economic operators from the Community
and the ACP States;
(iv) to carry out studies which will identify practical opportunities for
industrial cooperation with the Community; and
(v) to set up industrial promotion bodies in the ACP and to facilitate
access to and use of available data sources in the Community.

B.

Institutional Machinery for Implementing Title V
1.

Administrative Framework

Lom6 II continued and expanded on the administrative structure
first outlined in Lom6 I. It maintained the three Lom6 I institutions
directly charged with the responsibility of implementing the Convention's industrial cooperation objectives. These are the Committee on

Industrial Cooperation (CIC), the Center for Industrial Development
(CID), and an Advisory Council.'

15

113 Id. art. 76.
114 Id. art. 77(1).
115 For a description of these institutions see supra note 50.
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a.

The Committee on Industrial Cooperation (CIC)

Articles 78(1) and 81(1) define the duties of the CIC while Article
78(2) provides that its composition and detailed rules of operation are
to be determined by the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers." 6 Generally,
the CIC monitors the overall progress of industrial cooperation. More
particularly, it:
(i) will examine and evaluate problems and policy issues in the field of
industrial cooperation presented to it by the Convention partners
and suggest appropriate solutions;
(ii) may organize, at the request of either the Community or the ACP
States, a review of trends in industrial policies and developments in
the world industrial situation; and
(iii) guides, supervises, and controls the activities of the Center for Industrial Development,
and examines and adopts CID's operational
7
budget.' 1
The Committee, which is composed of one representative of each
Member State of the European Communities, and of the Commission
and eighteen ACP representatives, reports to the Committee of
Ambassadors." 8
b. The Center for Industrial Development (CID)
Article 80 specifies the functions of the CID which include the
following:
(i) gathering and disseminating information as well as organizing contacts between economic and financial operators and industrial policy-makers in the Community and in the ACP States;
(ii) providing expert advisory services including the execution of feasibility studies aimed at accelerating the establishment of industrial
undertakings in the ACP States;
(iii) identifying and evaluating opportunities for industrial training to
meet the needs of ACP States, and seeking out possibilities of acquiring, adapting, and developing appropriate industrial technology; and
(iv) identifying possible sources of financing.
In fulfilling these duties, the Center is mandated by Article 80(2) to pay
particular attention to the problems of the least developed, land-locked
and island ACP States. Articles 81(1) and (2) provide that the Center
shall come under the Committee on Industrial Cooperation and shall
be administered by a director assisted by a deputy, both of whom are
appointed by the CIC.
116 Lom6 II, supra note 3.
117 Id. art. 81(5).
118 Id. arts. 171-74.
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The Advisory Council

The Advisory Council is composed of "persons with wide experience in the industrial field especially in the manufacturing sector."" 9
They are chosen by the CIC on an individual basis, from nationals of
the ACP-EEC States. The Council's tasks are:
(i) to advise and assist the Center in the programming and development
of its industrial activities; and
(ii) when appropriate, to give its opinion 20on the Center's annual work
program, budget, and general report.'
2. FinancingIndustrialDevelopment
a.

Volume

With the exception of Article 81(5) which sets a ceiling on the
amount the Community will contribute to the budget of the CID, no
specific amount is set aside in the industrial regime for implementing
its objectives. The two other clauses in the regime which touch on
financing-Articles 75 and 76(2)--direct attention instead to Title VII
of the Convention for specific information about the financing of industrial cooperation programs. In other words, all the opportunities
offered under the financial and technical cooperation regime of the
for underwriting industrial cooperConvention, Title VII, are available
2
ation programs and projects.' '
Under Title VII, Community financial assistance to the ACP
States for the lifetime of the Convention had been set at 5,227 million
EUA,122 broken down as follows: 4,542 million EUA from the European Development Fund (EDF) of which 2,928 million EUA is in the
form of grants, 504 million EUA in the form of special loans and 280
million EUA in the form of risk capital for a total project aid of 3,712
million EUA; 550 million EUA and 280 million EUA earmarked for
STABEX 123 and SYSMIN'14 respectively; plus an additional contribu119 Id. art. 81(4).
120 Id. art. 81(3).
121 Id. art. 105.
122 Id. art. 95. This amount was increased by 380 million European Community Units (ECUs)
as a result of (a) the Community undertaking to cover the estimated 180 million ECU operating
costs of the commission delegations in the ACP States out of its general budget, rather than out of
the budget of the EDF; and (b) the provision for additional operations involving mining and
energy investments to be financed by the EIB from its own resources at an estimated cost of 200
million ECU. The overall amount of financial assistance from the EEC will be 5,607 million
ECU. See ACP-EEC Council of Ministers, Mar. 1, 1980-Feb. 28, 1981, ACP-EEC Convention of
Lom6, at 85 [hereinafter cited as Annual Report 21.
123 Lom6 II, supra note 3, art. 95(l)(a). STABEX is a commodity price insurance system
designed to remedy "the harmful effects of the instability of export earnings and to help the ACP
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tion of 685 million EUA from the European Investment Bank (EIB) in
the form of loans from the Bank's own resources with an interest rate
subsidy of three percent.' 25
b. Methods of Financing
Article 101 of Title VII identifies a variety of methods for financing projects or programs: grants, special loans from the EDF, risk capital, or loans from the EIB. The financing of industrial activities,
however, must first be drawn from EIB loans or risk capital. Recognizing that official development aid cannot hope to mobilize sufficient
funds to finance the ACP States' industrial development, cofinancing in
the form of joint public and private capital is encouraged. 126 At the
request of an ACP State and with the agreement of the other parties
concerned, the Commission or the EIB may act as a coordinating
agency for projects partially financed by them. 127 Finally, there is a
further contribution of up to 200 million EUA from the EIB for energy
and mining in the form of standard loans without interest rebates.128
The choice of priorities in the allocation of these funds, and hence
the sectoral distribution of the aid, is left entirely up to the ACP
States. 2 9 The Convention also leaves to ACP States the responsibility
for submitting requests for financing to the Community. 30 The Community may, however, provide technical assistance for drawing up the
dossiers of projects and programs if requested by the ACP States. 3 '
States overcome one of the main obstacles to the profitability and sustained growth of their economies;" the system is operated "to guarantee the stabilization of earnings derived from the ACP
States' exports to the Community of products on which their economies are dependent and which
are affected by fluctuations in price or quantity or both of these factors." Id. art. 23.
124 Id. art. 95(l)(a). SYSMIN does for mining products what STABEX does for agricultural
products. Id. art. 49. It provides two types of aid: (1) aid to maintain capacity for the production
of certain mining products, comprising financial and technical aid for projects and programs
through a "special financial facility," and (2) technical and financial assistance from the Community for the development of new mining and energy resources in the ACP States. Id. arts. 49, 51,
57, 58.
125 Id. art. 95(2).
126 Id. arts. 96-99.
127 Id.art. 100.
128 See L=rm.IIDossier,THE COURIER, Nov. 1979, at 31 [hereinafter cited as Lom 11Dossier].
129 Lom6 II, supra note 3, art. 108(2).
130 Id. art. 108(2)(b).
131 Id. art. 108(3).
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IV. DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF TITLE V
A.

Financing and Implementing Industrial Development

The ACP States viewed the financial package under Lom6 II as
"an acceptable minimum,"' 3 2 although it fell somewhat short of the
$10 billion they had requested. The roughly $6 billion in Lom6 II aid
spread over five years represents five percent of the EEC's total official
development assistance and a hefty sixty-five percent increase over
Lom6 I at current prices. Generous as this package appears to be, its
putative improvement over Lom6 I quickly vanishes when inflation is
taken into account. 133 In real terms, the increase adds up to only
34
twenty percent assuming annual world inflation of eight percent.'
And when the funds are divided among the now sixty-one ACP
States 3 ' instead of forty-six as in 1975, the aid is in fact less per capita
and less in purchasing power than under Lom6 1.136
The Community did not set aside a specific amount for financing
industrial cooperation, but instead provided that all the opportunities
offered under the Convention for financial cooperation could be tapped
for this purpose. An examination of the resources made available to
the EDF, EIB and CID should provide some idea of the Community's
commitment to the goal of industrial development in the ACP States.
1. The Ffth European Development Fund (EDF)131
The Lom6 II allocation to the EDF represents a fifty-five percent
increase over Lomd 1.138 A substantial portion of the allocation is re132 See Laishley, supra note 11, at 46. The comment is attributed to Michael Anchouey, Gabon's Planning Minister and the ACP chairman through much of the Lom6 II negotiations.
133 See Madeley, supra note 11, at 53.
134 See C. GOYBET, THE SECOND CONVENTION OF LoMt 4 (1982).

135 The accession of Zimbabwe, St. Vincent, and Vanuatu brought the total number of ACP
States to 61.
136 See Madeley, supra note 1I, at 53.

137 The EDF is made up of contributions from the Member States outside the framework of the
Community budget and over 50% of it is grant aid, primarily intended for projects with little
prospect of a sufficient rate of return to attract funds from the capital markets. EDF funding is
available on particularly favorable terms, and includes grants to which the least developed ACP
countries have priority access, and forty-year special loans which bear an interest rate of only one
percent (0.75% for the least developed countries) with repayment commencing after a ten-year
grace period. The first EDF, under the Treaty of Rome, ran from 1958 to 1963. The second EDF
coincided with the lifetime of the first Yaounde Convention (June 1, 1964-May 31, 1969); the third
EDF corresponded to Yaounde II (Jan. 1, 1971-Jan. 31, 1975); the penultimate fund, the fourth
EDF, covered the first Lom6 Convention (Apr. 1, 1976-Dec. 31, 1980). See GOYBET, supra note
134, at 1-2.
138 EDF allocation under Lom6 I was 2,980 million EUA compared to 4,636 million EUA
under Lom6 II. GOYBET, supra note 134, at 5. "In connection with Zimbabwe's accession to the
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served for the two traditional forms of aid-grants and repayable special loans-which increased by forty-five percent and sixteen percent
respectively. 139 Grants are non-repayable and are primarily intended
for the financing of economic and social infrastructures that are not
likely to show any return in the short term. Part of the 2,986 million
EUA earmarked for grants, however, will be used to subsidize interest
rates on EIB loans."4 This is worthy of note since the Convention provides that financing for industrial development must first be procured
in the form of loans from the EIB or risk capital. 4 '
Overall, the total EDF resources under Lom6 II as well as the allocations for grants and special loans are proportionally less than the allocations for Lom6 .42 For instance, the fourth EDF accounted for
86.2% of total resources delegated to both EDF and EIB, of which
grants made up 59.6% and special loans 12.9% of the total.' 43 However,
under Lom6 II, EDF's share of total delegations dropped by five percentage points while the decrease for grants and special loans was 7%
and 3.8% respectively. 144 The proportional reduction in EDF grants
and soft loans is offset by the new insurance system designed to stabilize the ACP States' mining and mineral exporting capacity (SYSMIN)
45
and the large increase in the amount of risk capital available.
The breakdown of aid by sectors shows that at the end of 1980,
328.8 million ECU,14 6 or 13.1% of total EDF aid, had been allocated to
the industrial sector. This amount was the fourth largest EDF V allocation, exceeded only by the allocations to economic infrastructure
147
(23.3%), rural production (20.2%), and social development (15.2%).
When both EDF and EIB allocations are combined, however, the share
for industrial development (28.2%) is the largest for all the sectors,
while the other three major sectors drop to 19.1%, 16.5%, and 12.4%
respectively. 148 The sectoral distribution of EEC funds clearly establish
Convention, the Member States signed an internal agreement amending the 1979 internal
financial agreement on 16 December 1980. The amendment increases the Fifth EDF's funds by
85 million EUA raising them from 4,636 million EUA to 4,721 million EUA." See Annual Report 2, supra note 122, at 112.
139 GOYBET, supra note 134, at 5.
140 See Lom6 II, supra note 3, art. 104(4).
141 Id. art. 101(2).
142 See GoYBET, supra note 134, at 5.
143 Id.
144 .d.
145 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
146 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
147 See Annual Report 2, supra note 122, at 103-08.
148 Id.
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the preeminence of industrial development in Lom. II.149
In order for this substantial financial commitment to have an impact on industrial development the money has to be spent, and it must
be spent quickly. This is particularly important if the real value is to be
insulated from the vagaries of inflation. But in the past, the EDF has
acted with something less than alacrity in disbursing aid.'
By July
1979, for example, only one-third of the Lomb I aid budget had been
actually spent.'' The delay in spending has been traced to the fact that
the EEC's "procedures are tortuous."' 5 2 Despite claims to the contrary,
the Second Lom6 Convention did little to streamline these procedures. 153 ACP States in need of financing are still required to submit
their requests in the form of a project dossier. The dossiers undergo
extensive appraisal in the appropriate Commission department in Brussels before they are forwarded to the EDF Committee or EIB Committee for approval, both of which are made up of representatives of the
EEC Member States. The proposal then moves up the "project pipeline"' 5 4 to either the Commission (in the case of grants and soft loans)
or to the EIB's Board of Directors (in the case of subsidized loans and
risk capital), who draw up a financing agreement which is then submit55
ted to the ACP State for signature.
Although the time lag between presentation and the actual disbursement of fund monies and start of work on the project is substantially less than the two years under the first EDF, 156 nevertheless, the
process remains quite protracted. 57 The Community has justified this
cumbersome procedure on the ground that it needs to have some control over the aid it dispenses to the ACP States; yet, this seeming obsession with accountability appears to the ACP States to reveal the
149 The EuropeanCommunity's Development CooperationPolicy 1980, THE COURIER, Sept.-Oct.
1981, at 55 [hereinafter cited as Development Policy 1980].
150 See The New Lome Convention, supra note 81, at 117.
151 See Ineffcient, Unfair and Un-British, THE ECONOMIST, May 9, 1979, at 81.
152 Id. One commentator has observed that pushing a project to the approval phase is "like
climbing a greasy pole; no sooner has some progress been made than another requirement is
presented and the project seems no nearer approval." Rajana, supra note 7, at 197. See Hill, The
EuropeanDevelopment FundProposalsforRenegotiation, in THE RENEGOTIATIONS OF THE LoMt

CONVENTION 1, 2 (Catholic Institute ed. 1978); see also supra notes 82, 86 and accompanying text.
153 See Lomb IIDossier,supra note 128, at 34. An ACP-EEC Committee was forced to investigate causes of delay and to recommend more expeditious procedures.
154 See TWITCHETT I, supra note 12, at 43.
155 See Lom6 II, supra note 3, arts. 109-18.
156 See TWITCHETT 1, supra note 12, at 43.
157 Madeley apparently exaggerates when he suggests that the time lag under Lom6 I was between two and three years. See Madeley, supra note 11, at 53.
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Community's fundamental distrust of them.15 8 The ACP finds this attitude somewhat ironic in view of the well-orchestrated attempts by the
EEC to promote the Lom6 Convention as a "partnership of equals."15 9
Although the ACP position evokes sympathy, it is nonetheless
flawed in two respects. First, it fails to recognize that as a practical
matter, aid donors expect some accountability from their recipients and
will impose certain institutional constraints on how funds are spent.
Donors are entitled to know whether their funds are being used properly or diverted for other purposes. Secondly, the ACP States have
misconceived the nature of their relationship with the EEC. In reality,
a strikingly lopsided arrangement is revealed when stripped of the
"partnership" veil. Dr. Twitchett, who cannot be accused of anti-Lom6
bias, has described Lom6 II as an arrangement in which the ACP States
"were confronted with a stark alternative-they could either accept or
reject EEC offers. . . . [The] agreement underlines that the EEC imposed its conception of the partnership on the ACP States."' 160 This assessment suggests that criticism of Lom. II by ACP sympathizers
should take as a point of departure the essential asymmetry of the
ACP-EEC partnership.
2. The European Investment Bank (EIB)
Industrial mining or energy investment projects are principally the
responsibility of the EIB. In order to help it meet this task, the Convention allocated 685 million EUA-a 76% increase over Lom6 I-in
loans from the Bank's own resources with interest rate subsidies of
three percent.1 6 1 Furthermore, the Bank may commit, on a case-bycase basis, an additional 200 million EUA of its own resources to mining and energy investment projects of mutual interest to the ACP countries and the Community. 162 When this provision is taken into account,
the Bank has access to 885 million EUA of funds, an increase of 126.9%
over Lom6 I, and a boost of its share of total Community resources
158 Id.

159 See, e.g., Madeley, supra note 11, at 53. If it is a partnership, the ACP States reason, then a
fortiori there ought to exist a mutuality of trust between the parties or, at the very minimum, a
willingness to learn to trust each other. Id See also P. COFFEY, THE EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE EEC (1976). Coffey maintains that the Community should be held to its own
description of its aid package as a "cooperative venture." Id. at 74, 94. See also Rajana, supra
note 7, at 193.
160 See Asante, supra note 11, at 690.
161 See GOYBET, supra note 134, at 5.
162 See Lom6 II, supra note 3, art. 59, annex XXXI. See also EUR. INVESTMENT BANK, 1981
ANN. REP., at 53 [hereinafter cited as EIB ANN. REP.].
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from 11.3% to 15.5%.163 Since the EIB also manages EDF risk capital,
it is responsible for administering roughly 23.8% of Lom& II resources,
as compared to 16.9% under Lom I.6
How the EIB handles these
resources will have a significant impact on the industrialization process
now underway in the ACP States.
Under Lom6 I approximately 65% of EIB's own resources was invested in industry and agroindustry, 33% in electricity production and
distribution, and about 2% in tourism. 165 Almost all (about 92%) of the
risk capital operations were for industrial investments, 6%went to services (such as tourism, 5%, feasibility studies and technical assistance,
1.2%), and the remaining 2% to holdings in ACP development banks. 6 6
In the first year of operation of Lom6 II, the Bank granted twelve loans
totalling 118.4 million ECU and was involved in eighteen risk capital
operations for an aggregate of 49.5 million ECU subsidized by the
EDF. 167 The Bank also advanced a nonsubsidized loan for 40 million
ECU. 168 Certain trends with respect to sectoral distribution are already
emerging based on an analysis of the Bank's first year of operation.
The bulk of its financing went into mining and quarrying (36.7%), energy (30.7%), manufacturing industry (25.2%, of which 13.4% was for
smaller businesses), and transport infrastructure and services (6.9%).169
The high concentration of Bank financing in the mining and energy
sectors is quite consistent with the prominence given these two areas in
the Convention. 7 ° This stems in large measure from the recognition
that protection and expansion of the energy and mining sectors is basic
to industrial development in the ACP States. 7 '
A major thrust of the industrial regime is the call for an expanded
industrial base which would, in the long run, have a favorable impact
on the employment situation. Job creation for ACP nationals is thus
given prominence in Article 73. The EIB estimates that the funds invested so far in nineteen African countries should help to create directly about 5,000 jobs, the majority of which will be in the industrial
sector. 172 Thus, about 570,000 ECU have been spent per job.' The
163 See GOYBET, supra note 134, at 5.

164 Id. at 6.
165 See Lomb II Dossier,supra note 128, at 34.
166 Id.

167 See EIB ANN. REP., supra note 162, at 53.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 55.

170 See Lom6 II, supra note 3, art. 76.
171 See Lomb II Dossier,supra note 128, at 34.
172 See EIB ANN. REP., supra note 162, at 55.
173 Id.
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high average investment cost needed to create one new job in industry
is largely "a reflection of the preponderance of major mining and energy projects and conversion and modernization schemes within the
sum total of financing channelled into individual projects."' 74 The
high cost per job also confirms ACP fears that the capital intensive,
labor saving approach to industrialization may not provide productive
employment for the vast majority of the African labor force. Estimates
by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa show that the
shift toward heavy industry will result in an annual growth rate of employment in the manufacturing sector of only four percent. 175 Given
the present share of manufacturing in the African labor force of eight
percent of total employment, by the year 2000 employment in this sector would account for only ten percent of the total labor force. 76 Of an
estimated 225 million people who will be added to the labor force, only
twelve percent, or 27 million people, will find employment in the manufacturing sector by the end of the century.' 7 7
3.

The Centerfor IndustrialDevelopment (CID)

A pivotal institution in stimulating industrial development is the
CID, first set up in 1977. Among its many responsibilities is ensuring
that aid to the industrial sector is properly implemented. To meet its
operating and programmatic activities, the Center can draw a separate
allocation of up to 25 million EUA "from the resources earmarked
under Article 133 for the financing of regional cooperation projects."178
The Center's allocation supplements the normal support for industrialization provided by the EDF and the financial and technical cooperation provisions of the Convention.
The CID was designed to act as a conduit between the ACP States
and European industrialists. In the performance of this role, the CID
was required to concentrate on collecting data on the possibilities of
industrial cooperation, facilitating consultations on the transfer of appropriate technology, organizing seminars, and establishing contact between prominent EEC and ACP industrialists.179 Through the CID's
intervention, nineteen firms were set up and eight expanded in the first
174 Id.

175 Adedeji, Development and Economic Growth in Africa to the Year 2000: Alternative Projections andPolicies, in ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR AFRICA 279, 293 (T. Shaw ed. 1982).
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See Lom6 II, supra note 3, art. 81(5).
179 See id. arts. 80-81.
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year of application of Lom6 I.180 The Center has also been involved
investment agreements which are in various
in negotiating fifty-one
8
1
completion.
stages of
These statistics do not reveal much in terms of the CID's achievements. For instance, they tell us little with respect to the significance
that ought to be accorded the number of new firms established or expanded under the Center's prodding. The CID has not identified the
optimum number of firms that must be established as a prelude to the
industrial take-off in the ACP States; nor has it indicated how many
firms have left the ACP for more salubrious investment shores. Another problem is that of trying to measure how well the CID has performed in the area of technology transfer given the absence of a base
which would permit comparisons. But even without these bases one
can, after examining the African situation, draw some conclusions with
respect to the formidable obstacles confronting the CID in its role as a
conduit for technology transfer.
Two examples will suffice. It is generally accepted that the transfer of industrial property is a legitimate means of spreading technical
information and a vital means of transferring technology from the industrialized to the non-industrialized world.' 8 2 With respect to Africa,
the evidence indicates that this asset is not only in short supply, but the
potential for growth is quite minimal. This conclusion is dramatically
revealed in the decline in Africa's share of patents in force and applications for patents between 1975 and 1978.183 To the extent that the
transfer of industrial property also involves a corresponding transfer of
industrial skills, the African situation is far from encouraging. When
one examines the total stock of scientific and technical manpower
available for Africa's industrial revolution, again the picture that
emerges is not hopeful. From 1970-77, Africa's share of the worldwide
stock of scientists and engineers was 1.6% and 0.1% for technicians.' 8 4
Of the total supply of scientists and engineers, and technicians in Africa, only 3.5% and 1.2% were actively engaged in research and development. 85 In contrast, Cuba freed 8.2% of its scientists and engineers
180 See Development Policy 1980, supra note 149, at 59.
181 See id.
182 Mezieres, Patentsand Technology: The Work ofthe EuropeanPatentsOffice, THE COURIER,
May-June 1979, at 85. See also P. CATEORA & J. HESS, INTERNATIONAL MARKETING 196passim
(1979); F. ROOT, FOREIGN MARKET ENTRY STRATEGIES 96passim (1982).

183 See U.N. STATISTICAL Y.B. 1979/80 ST/ESA/STAT/SER.S/7 at 859-61 [hereinafter cited
as U.N.Y.B.].
184 Id. at 867-75.
185 Id.

Title V of the 2nd Lomb Convention
5:352(1983)
86
for research and development during this same period.

B.

Nonofficial Assistance

It was recognized during the life of Lom6 I that official aid on its
own did not go far enough in financing development in the industrial
sector. For instance, Lome" I accounted for no more than 4% to 6% of
Member States' total aid to the developing world while Community aid
as a whole represented between 7.5% and 10% of total official development assistance. 187 By comparison, Lom& II accounts for only 5% of
the Member States' total aid to all developing countries and this
88
amount is likely to decline during the life of this convention.1
Meanwhile, costs for projects are becoming quite prohibitive. For
example, the estimated cost of financing the West Africa Cement Company is 249 million ECU and the Bardheera Dam in Somalia will cost
an estimated 433 million ECU. 8 9 For the expansion of their construction sector and the development of hydroelectric power, these African
states cannot rely on official development assistance (ODA) because
this source of funding is becoming increasingly scarce. The European
economies themselves are caught in a recessionary cycle and are strug0 Consequently, resources
gling to regain their economic momentum. 19
that would have gone toward assisting in the development of the ACP
States are being diverted into domestic production systems in an effort
to revive them. This shrinking of the resource pool from whence ODA
has sprung is very much evident in the official contributions to the two
Lom6 Conventions. This is one reason that the EEC and ACP countries, in a joint declaration, recognized "the need to tap additional
financial resources that would make available substantial capital resources for industrial development."' 19 1
1.

Co-financing192

The Convention, therefore, placed much emphasis on co-financing
involving the ACP-EEC and other multilateral agencies like the World
186 Id. Out of 541,328 scientists and engineers in Brazil, 13,678 or 0.025% were engaged in
research and development. And of India's 697,600 scientists and engineers, 28,233 or 0.040% were
similarly involved. Id. at 869. Clearly the problem of inadequate scientific and technical manpower is not uniquely African. The Center for Industrial Development clearly should not be held
responsible for this state of affairs.
187 See GoYBEr, supra note 134, at 8.
188 Id. at 3.
189 Id. at 28.
190 See Mytelka & Dolan,supra note 11.
191 Lom6 II, supra note 3, annex X Final Act.
192 Id. arts. 54, 58, 76, 96-100.
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Bank. Particular emphasis was placed on Arab funds which were actively sought under Lom6 I and which accounted for 17.5% of all EDF
and EIB operations, next only in order of volume to the EEC and selffinancing by ACP countries. 93 Overall, over 28% of the Fourth EDF
Project resources and 44% of EIB administered funds were involved in
co-financial operations. 194 This feature of Lom6 I was continued under
Lom6 II. The Commission has developed a long list of regional and
national projects in West and East Africa it intends to co-finance.
These include projects in195the priority industrial sectors as well as infrastruxctural development.
2. PrivateInvestments
Given the limits of official aid, the signatories to the Convention
wisely concluded that additional resources can come only from private
investment. To attract private capital, a uniform investment code was
included in the Convention. 196 It provides that the ACP States will
treat companies that are nationals of the EEC Member States on a nondiscriminatory basis. This means that each ACP State is required not
to give preferential treatment to any EEC country at the expense of
other EEC countries; thus, removing the old colonial preferences, and
opening up the ACP markets and investment opportunities to EEC
Member States which never possessed colonies.
There is little indication that private EEC firms are responding.
Such a conclusion can be reached from an examination of figures on
transfers of both tangible and intangible resources from the EEC to
Africa. With respect to the latter, the argument can be made that
where the investment climate is conducive, domestic European companies will be most willing to make available their intangible assets, such
as patents, trade secrets, know-how, and trademarks, to foreign companies in Africa in return for royalties and/or other forms of payment.' 9 7
Conversely, where the foreign market offers little or no guarantee
against pirating or infringing upon such valuable assets, the domestic
firm would be hesitant to expose its industrial properties. 198 For a variety of reasons, 99 the flow of industrial properties to Africa has consti193 See GOYBET, supra note 134, at 29.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 31.
196 See Lom6 II, supra note 3, arts. 60-64, annex IX.
197 See RoOT, supra note 182.
198 Id.

199 It could be argued that the African share is so small because these valuable industrial assets

have been appropriated and profitably exploited in many of these countries without benefit of
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tuted little more than a trickle. For the period 1970-75, Africa's share
of the total world applications for patents as well as patents in force
stood at 0.4% and 8.8% respectively.2 "0 By 1978, the continent's share
in both categories decreased even more, to 0.3% and 0.5% respectively.2 01 In this same year, by way of contrast, Japan accounted for a
little over one-fifth of total world applications for patents and one-tenth
of the patents in force.2" 2

Turning now to the transfer of tangible assets, available figures
confirm the aforementioned pattern of distribution. The direction of
investment appears to be toward other parts of the Third World. Africa's share of the total net flow of private investments from the Development Assistance Committee2" 3 to the LDCs for the period 1973-79
averaged only 9.2%.2 4 More significantly, Africa's share, which was at
its peak in 1975 when Lom6 I was signed, plummeted to 6.9% in 1979,
the year that Convention expired.20 5 If this is any indication of what
awaits the new Convention, it is clear that Africa will have to contend
with the competition coming from other LDCs in attracting private investment from the EEC. Private firms will venture into foreign markets
to obtain raw materials, to acquire manufacturers at a lower cost, and
to penetrate local markets.2 "6 The decision to invest in a particular
country is arrived at. after careful evaluation of both the investment
climate in the target country and the nature of the intended investment
project. Investment climate embraces all the environmental factors and
forces-political, economic, and sociocultural-that can have a significant influence on the profit margins and safety of the proposed investment project.20 7 When the present and future risks outweigh the
probable gains, investors will prefer to go elsewhere.
Private investors, it would seem, are attracted only to those Third
license. However, the fact that
number of multilateral treaties
See Haseltine, Lake & Walers,
INT'L, Apr. 9, 1976, at 116-17.
200 See U.N.Y.B., supra note

the majority of African States are signatories to any one of a
designed to protect industrial property weakens this argument.
New Patent Systems: "hat They Offer, How They Dfer, Bus.
183.

201 Id.
202 Id.

203 The Development Assistance Committee is made up of the following states: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Note that seven members of DAC belong to the European Economic Community.
204 See OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 1976/
1979 (1980).
205 Id.
206 See generally RooT, supra note 182, at 138, 142passim.
207 Id.
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World countries which already have a solid foundation: an industrial
fabric, a credit network, services, experienced executives, skilled and
semi-skilled workers, high worker productivity, and political stability.2"' Few African countries possess these crucial basics. Any assessment of the reluctance of European private capital to venture into the
African markets must include these structural constraints in the

calculus.
Unfortunately Lom6 II provides no solid guarantees against these
noncommercial risks.2" 9 Articles 60 through 64, which address this

area, merely provide for the extension of individual ACP investment
protection agreements with one EEC Member State to include all new
EEC investments.2 10 Protecting private investments is left to bilateral
intergovernmental investment agreements. 2 " In failing to establish
machinery to protect private investment, the Lom. II industrial regime
will likely not reverse the trend in the flow of private capital from the
EEC to Africa. This failure is partly because of the resistance of the
ACP States against what they perceive to be encroachments on their
sovereignty. The ACP States believe that decisions bearing on private
investments should be left to the state. Because they are economically
vulnerable, the ACP States are wary, from bitter experience, of giant
multinational firms which have ridden rough shod over their economies behaving much as if they are the new sovereigns.21 2 The ACP
States were understandably reluctant to accord these global behemoths
any status in the Convention.
208 See GOYBET, supra note 134, at 62.
209 These fears are apparently greatly exaggerated. The right of states to freely use and exploit
their natural wealth and resources is an inherent attribute of their sovereignty. See generally
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963), reprintedin 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprintedin 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975). States are, nonetheless, bound by the law
of nations to respect private property and may not derogate from this principle except for reasons
of public utility in time of peace and requisition in war. See G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONs 233-34 (3d ed. 1976). The vast majority of the ACP States have elected not to tamper with
foreign capital investment, even at the expense of their political independence. See 0. UDOKANG,
SUCCESSION OF NEW STATES TO INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 463-78 (1972).
210 See Lom6 II, supra note 3, arts. 60-64.
211 Id. art. 2(a), annex IX.
212 Foreign firms have dominated the economies of Third World countries and in the process
have created the international equivalent of old American "company towns": United Fruit (Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua); Firestone (Liberia); Union Miniere
(Zaire). See, e.g., L. TURNER, MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD (1975); see

also THE WORLD AS A COMPANY TowN (A. Soven ed. 1978).
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C. The Problem of Decapitalization
No discussion of private capital flows into the Third World can be
complete without mention of the problem of decapitalization-the outflow of capital from the recipient states back to its place of origin. This
phenomenon occurs in several forms: through repatriated profits, debt
service, and interest and amortization costs. Debt service tends to increase concomitantly with an increase in borrowing. 13 Calculations by
the United Nations Industrial Organization (UNIDO) indicate that the
relative increase in private sector ODA sources has resulted in a rise in
the average rate of interest on the debt of Third World countries from
4.5% in 1974 to 6.4% in 1977.214 In the same period the rate of amortization increased by about 42%." l5
The total service costs of nonguaranteed private debt for 1976
stood at 34.4%.216 When this debt service is added to profits on foreign
capital stock and quasi-profits in the form of royalties, Third World
countries experienced an estimated outflow of $49.3 billion compared
with a total inflow in 1976 of $59 billion; or put differently, enjoyed a
net transfer gain of only $9.7 billion. 1 7 Furthermore, it has been estimated that twenty-seven percent of foreign capital now entering the
non-oil exporting Third World countries-including all of sub-Saharan
Africa with the exception of Nigeria, Angola, Gabon and Cameroonwill go toward refinancing maturing debts.2 " 8 This figure is likely to
rise to sixty-five percent by 1985.219
Unfortunately, data is not readily available for calculating the
magnitude of new private capital inflows and reverse flows for Africa
alone. This prevents any meaningful discussion on the real impact of
EEC private capital transfers on African industrial development during
the tenure of Lom&II. However, one can still extrapolate from the data
presented thus far that: (1) Africa, like the rest of the Third World, will
on the average spend significantly more of its private funds on service
costs than on its socio-economic development, and (2) if the trend as
forecast continues, these costs are likely to rise to almost two-thirds of
213
214
215
216

See TURNER, supra note 212.
See UNIDO, supra note 15.
The actual rate of amortization increased from 9.1% to 13.3%. Id. at 299.
Id. at 301.

217 Id.
218 Id.

219 The Euromarketsin 1978, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1978, at 54;see also UNIDO,supranote 15, at
301. The concentration of maturing external debt is a result of the "steady shortening of the

average life of syndicated credit." Id. To repay the short-term nonguaranteed private debts, the
LDCs must borrow even more from the developing countries. Id.
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Africa's external borrowings during the next three years. Indeed in the
first two years of Lom6 I, about seventy percent of Community aid was
repatriated to the EEC in the form of capital or as fees for services.22 0
Such massive financial drains, especially for a continent that is
financially anemic, raise very serious and fundamental questions about
the proper role of foreign capital, and the wisdom of relying so heavily
upon it in African industrial development. More concerned with protecting its private investors, the EEC chose not to confront this issue
when it was raised by the African partners during the negotiations for
Lom6 11.221 As a result, a problem with such far-reaching implications
for African development was accorded no recognition in a Convention
dedicated to the achievement of that very goal.
D.

Recommendations in Anticipation of Lom6 III
L

RegionalIndustrialDevelopment Banks

The project by project method of dispensing aid which offended
ACP sensibilities during Lom6 I was adopted with few modifications in
the successor Convention.2 2 2 However, the interests of both parties can
still be accommodated through the establishment of regional industrial
development banks (RIDB) in Africa.2 23 The RIDBs could be funded
from part of the resources allocated to the European Development
Fund as well as some of the European Investment Bank funds destined
for national development banks.2 24 In addition, the RIDBs would be
able to mobilize resources within the regions for investment in priority
industries. The management of such banks should be drawn from
among ACP nationals familiar with the structure and dynamics of critical industries within their respective regions, and the manpower, technology, marketing, and financial requirements specific to their regions.
Bank lending policies would be tailored to the industrial development
priorities and policies of each region. Thus, the establishment of such
banks would remove the need to have the ACP States submit their
220 The figure was cited by Mr. G6rard Kango Ou6drago, ACP co-chairman of the joint committee of the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly during its meeting in Bordeaux (France) from
January 29 to February 1, 1979. See The Convention at Work, THE COURIER, Mar.-Apr. 1979, at
1-11.
221 Id.
222 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
223 See ECON. COMM'N FOR AFRICA, BIENNIAL REP. OF THE ExEcUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE

ECON. COMM. FOR AFRICA 1977-78, E/CN.14/695 1979, at 1-16.
224 The premise here is that industrial development cannot be successfully prosecuted from the
parochial confines of the nation-state. Given the formidable obstacles of development, only a
massive Pan-African effort can begin to make some headway. Short of this continent-wide commitment, the next best approach would appear to be a regional one.
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projects to bureaucrats in Brussels for processing; bureaucrats who may

not have an appreciation for the nuances and subtleties lurking in the
interstices of ACP underdevelopment. Bureaucratic delays in aid implementation would also be reduced.
Since the RIDB's resources will come from within the ACP as well
as from the EEC, this limits the likelihood of ACP mismanagement.
The Community could take comfort from this fact, enough to want to

relax its current hold over EDF funds. This framework would also
reduce the cost of administering EEC aid as fewer bureaucrats would
be needed on the EDF payroll.
2. Private Investment Insurance Program
In order to encourage EEC firms to invest in the ACP States, the
Member States would have to provide concrete inducements in the

form of officially backed assurance against noncommercial risks. One
approach would be to have the Member States establish a scheme for

foreign investors to purchase insurance against particular risks.225 Alternatively, the Community could limit or withhold official development assistance to those ACP States which have expropriated EEC-

controlled property without adequate compensation. The insurance
approach could be along the lines of the United States Export-Import

Bank (Eximbank) which financially underwrites international trade
and investment activities of American firms and also provides, for cost,
guarantees against certain kinds of political risks.226 In addition to the

Eximbank approach, a broader-risk insurance coverage to companies
investing in the Third World is provided by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), which began operations in 197 1.227
As an alternative measure, both partners to the Lom6 Convention
225 See Okolie, The Multilateral Investment Insurance in the Context of InternationalLaw and
the New International Economic Order, 6 GA. PoL. ScI. A. J. 77 (1978) discussing the concept of
international multilateral investment insurance. Although Okolie's comments are directed to the
establishment of a United Nations-type multilateral investment treaty, they nonetheless apply
with equal force to the ACP-EEC context. Basic to Okolie's concept is the need to provide an
international machinery for guaranteeing private foreign investments in the Third World. The
concern here is the same although the machinery envisaged would span only a fraction of the

family of nations.
226 See CATEORA & HEss, supra note 182, at 167-69.
227 Wheelock, What Is the Direction of U.S. Political Risk Insurance? 8 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus.
59 (1973). See also CATEORA & HEss, supra note 182, at 168-69. OPIC now operates in more
than 100 developing countries around the world. In the last decade OPIC has written more than
$10 billion in political risk insurance, provided more than $265 million in financing commitments
and paid, guaranteed, or provided indemnities for more than $373 million to settle 111 insurance
claims. See Kammert, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, in W. BAUGHN & MANDICH,
INT'L BANKINO HANDBOOK 301 (1983).
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could establish a joint ACP-EEC investment insurance scheme along
the lines of OPIC. A leading scholar in this area has suggested that
capital for the reserve fund to back up such an insurance scheme could
come from contributions from the signatory states. 228 This could take
the form of a fixed percentage of the GNP of the individual ACP-EEC
States taking into account the disparities in their respective economic
strengths, for example, a lower GNP would result in a lower contribution. Private EEC firms wishing to invest in the ACP States would be
required to pay a premium for insurance which would vary in amount
depending upon factors such as the type and size of firm, the particular
project being undertaken, and the relative degree of political stability
in the target country.2 2 9

The fund's compensatory feature would be triggered whenever an
EEC-based firm suffered a loss in its investments in an ACP State because of contract default by way of expropriation or nationalization. In
cases of repeated defaults by a participating ACP State "causing the
fund to pay off upon a policy, its membership fee would be increased.
Any nation that failed to pay its share of the proposed policy would be
penalized under the penalty clause" in the insurance treaty.230 The
proposed ACP-EEC investment insurance regime could take the form
of a multilateral treaty or be included as a separate title in the next
Lom6 Convention.
Such a proposed investment insurance regime does not, to be sure,
resolve the problem of insufficient private capital inflows to the African
states. While it holds out some promise for reducing noncommercial
risks, its implementation would still leave unresolved the fundamental
problem of inadequate infrastructure in ACP States. To its credit,
however, the Lom6 II industrial regime has anticipated this problem.
Various provisions have acknowledged the compelling need to erect an
infrastructure capable of attracting as well as retaining private foreign
investments. 3 Yet it will take some time before this goal becomes a
reality. If the experience of countries in Asia and Latin AmericaIndia, Singapore, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico-hold out
any lesson for other Third World countries in the throes of industrialization, it is that the process of infrastructural development is a protracted affair indeed. 32 Few African countries will be poised for an
228 See Okolie, supra note 225, at 81.
229 Id.
230 Id.

231 See Lom6 II, supra note 3, arts. 71-72 (transfer of technology and industrial infrastructure

respectively).
232

Still, such analysis does not require the conclusion that Africa will develop along the lines
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industrial boom a few years hence when Lom6 II expires. This point
deserves mentioning since most critics of the Convention seem to confuse it with a deus ex machina capable of working miracles where
mortals have failed.2 33 The Lom6 II industrial regime cannot and
should not be expected to transform overnight Africa's crusty infrastructure into a smoothly running industrial machine. It can only lay
the groundwork, and in this respect some of its provisions give reasons
for hope.
3. Indexing Aid Against World Inflation
Community aid should be indexed against a world inflation rate
that has been on the increase throughout much of this and the last decade."M In light of the long delays before Community approval for
ACP projects is given, indexing protects the purchasing power of development funds. It is important that when these funds are finally released, recipient states should still be able to complete their projects,
even though costs would most likely have been pushed up by inflation.
4. Measurable Goals andIdentpFable Targets
The goals of the institutions responsible for implementing industrial cooperation must be stated in such a way that they are measurable.
Targets and time tables must be identified so as to allow for evaluation
of performance against a baseline, in the absence of which no meaningful comparisons can be made. An approach that holds out much promise is that adopted by both the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) 235 and
UNIDO's Lima Declaration. 236 The LPA grew out of the 1980 Organization for African Unity Economic Summit which was entirely devoted
followed by any of these countries. Every society has its own dynamics of change and each develops at its own pace. In any event, the attainment of industrial and agricultural revolutions for the
currently industrialized nations of the world did not occur in one generation. On this point both
classical (Rostow, Hirschman, Nurkse) and non-classical (Amin, Arrighi, Furtado) theorists of
underdevelopment are in agreement. For various theories of underdevelopment and economic

development, see generally S. AMIN, ACCUMULATION WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1974); G. ARRIGHI, ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA (1973); G. BECKFORD, PERSISTENT POVERTY: UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN THE PLANTATION
ECONOMIES OF THE THIRD WORLD (1972); C. FURTADO, DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1964); A. HIRSCHMAN, THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1958); R. NURKSE,
PROBLEMS OF CAPITAL FORMATION IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1967); W. RosTow, THE
STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1962); T. SZENTS, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UN-

DERDEVELOPMENT (1971).
233 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
234 See Adedeji, supra note 175, at 287.
235 See Blueprintfor Survival, AFRICA, June 1980, at 14.
236 See UNIDO, supra note 15.
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to the discussion of the continent's economic problems and their resolution.2 37 The Plan set short, medium, and long-term targets to boost the
level of industrial production in Africa. It hoped in the short-term period (to 1985), to increase African production to at least one percent of
world industrial production while laying the foundation for the development of basic industries essential for self-reliant development. The
medium-term (1985-90) goal would be to increase the African share to
1.4% of world industrial production and establish regional self-sufficiency in food, building materials, clothing, and energy. The long
range goal (post 1990) is geared toward meeting the Lima target for
Africa of two percent of world industrial production by the end of this
century.238 This modest goal was considered achievable since it was
based on a realistic assessment of world development trends. Should
the Lom6 industrial regime institutions adopt a modified version of the
LPA timetable with its well-defined targets, a base would be provided
for mounting any meaningful assessment of their overall performance.
CONCLUSION

The focus of this inquiry has been on Title V of the Second Lom6
Convention. Despite Lom6 II's increased attention to the industrial
sector, the industrial regime that was forged out of the negotiations is
not likely to have a major impact on African industrialization. Like
any agreement involving multiple parties, the compromises that had to
be made in order to get it accepted by all sides succeeded in emasculating much of Title V's strength. But even if the Community had acquiesced in all ACP demands, the ensuing industrial regime would still not
have been adequately equipped for combatting the fundamental
problems of African underdevelopment. Because the obstacles are
many and varied, their eventual eradication requires a massive commitment not only of financial, but of political and moral capital.
Africa needs a new internal politico-economic order as much as it
does a New International Economic Order. The will to change must
and can come only from within the continent. From the outside, Africa
should ask for, and expect no more than the assistance with which to
lay the foundations for its collective, self-reliant and self-sustained
growth and development. Imperfect as it is, the Lom. industrial re237 See Blueprintfor Survival, supra note 235, at 14passim.
238 Id. The estimate for achieving the rather modest goal is $250 billion. See The Hurdles
Ahead, AFRICA, June 1980, at 18.
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gime is a model of such external commitment to African industrial
development.
Ndiva Kofele-Kale*
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